The Role of the United Nations in Mine Action An Interview with Ian Mansfield by Busé, Margaret S.
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 
Volume 6 
Issue 1 The Journal of Mine Action Article 2 
April 2002 
The Role of the United Nations in Mine Action An Interview with 
Ian Mansfield 
Margaret S. Busé 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Emergency and Disaster Management Commons, 
Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, and the Peace and Conflict 
Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Busé, Margaret S. (2002) "The Role of the United Nations in Mine Action An Interview with Ian Mansfield," 
Journal of Mine Action : Vol. 6 : Iss. 1 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol6/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at 
JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction by an 
authorized editor of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact dc_admin@jmu.edu. 
The Role of the United 
Nations in Mine Action 
An Interview with I an Mansfield 
I an Mansfield of the United Nations Development Programme talks candidly 
about the various mine action offices in the UN, how the UN organizes 
mine action, the role of host governments, donors, and the successes and 
challenges of coordinating integrated mine action activities with 
infrastructure development and capacity building. 
by Margaret Buse, Editor 
lan Mansfield (IM): Mine action is 
relatively new for the United Nations; rhe 
whole sector is just over 10 years old. The 
first time the UN ever became involved 
with humanitarian deminingwas in 1988 
in Afghanistan. Landmines were a big 
problem at rhe time the Soviets pulled 
om, and with 3 mill ion refugees in Paki-
stan and 2 million in Iran, the UN rec-
ognized that th is could lead to a great 
humanita rian tragedy o nce the refugees 
starred to return. So, in October 1988, 
the UN launched an appeal for assistance 
to Afghanistan, and rhe appeal included 
an allowance for humanitarian demining. 
The UN also looked around for imple-
menting partners, which is how we nor-
mally conduct projects, bur there weren't 
any NGOs working in demining in Af-
ghanistan at the rime, so we decided to 
set up a local program. The first strategy 
of that was to train hundreds of Afghan 
men, to clear up their own villages, but 
that didn't work because for various rea-
sons, and the refugees ended up not return-
ing en masse anyway. Based on this early 
experience we had in Afghanistan, we real-
ized thatthere was a need for demining, as 
it was called then, to be done on a more 
controlled and organized basis. 
Margaret Buse (MB): Where did 
you look for your technical capa bili-
t ies for that project? 
IM: In the early days, it was mostly mili-
tary or ex-military personnel. Countries 
like the US, Canada, Australia- about 
seven countries in total, provided mili-
tary experts to train the Afghans. After 
we realized though, that it could be done 
on a more structured basis, rhe UN over-
saw the creation of a number of Afghan 
NGOs . This was very successful and to-
day rhey now employ around 5000 
peopl e. One or rwo international 
demining organizations also got rheir 
starr in Afghanistan around that rime 
MB: What was your role? 
IM: I was rhe UN Programme Manager 
for the Mine Action Programme for Af-
ghanistan from late 1991 until the end 
of 1995. Martin Barber (now rhe Chief 
of UN MAS) was also there at the time 
with the overall UN coordinating body. 
MB: What was the next milestone for 
mine action? 
IM: The next big event for the land mine 
issue was rhe Gulf War. The UN wasn't 
involved in demining activities in Kuwait, 
but the war really brought landmines and 
UXO to rhe world's attention. The way 
Kuwait dealt with the mines was inter-
esting. They had lots of money, so they 
used commercial d emining contracts 
worth about US$700 million. Within 
rvvo or three years, the mines were cleared. 
That just goes to show that a landmine 
problem can be solved, if you've got the 
money and the resources; it's not mission 
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impossible. However- this situation ob-
viously isn't typical, because most of the 
countries that are mined are poor, so there 
have to be other ways to deal with rhe 
ISSUe. 
The next rime the UN got involved 
in mine action was in Cambodia. After 
rhe UNTAC peacekeeping mission fin-
ished in 1993, rhe UNDP was asked to 
continue providing assistance. We helped 
to set up the Cambodian Mine Action 
Centre, which is now one of the largest 
na tional institutions. Since then, it's just 
grown. Mozambique, Angola, Bosnia and 
so on, and even more countries since the 
Onawa Treaty was signed, have all asked 
the UN for assistance with mine action. 
MB: There are many UN agencies 
and departments with an interest in 
mine action. Who does what? 
IM: In fact 11 Departments or Agencies 
have some responsibility, which just 
shows the breadth of the mine action is-
sue- political, disarmament, operations, 
public health, education, capacity build-
ing and so on. The primary department 
is Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
through a special office they established 
called rhe UN Mine Action Service 
(UN MAS). That came about in Septem-
ber 1 998, after a few years of split respon-
sibilities between DPKO and the Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Aid (OCH A). At that time, rhe Secre-
tary-General issued a new policy stating 
who did what in mine action in the UN, 
and DPKO became rhe focal point. 
OCHA still plays a role, especially in 
humanitarian issues, and interestingly- his-
torically, they have been the deparrmenr 
in charge of activities in Afghanistan. 
That's in the process of changing over at 
the moment though. 
At the same organisational level as 
DPKO, you have the Department of Po-
litical Affairs, which doesn't have a stared 
role in the policy, but stills plays an im-
portant role when it comes to dealing 
wirh landm ines in peace treaties being 
negotiated within the UN system. The 
most recent example of that was with 
Eritrea and Ethiopia, where there were 
allowances that both sides would provide 
information on minefields. That require-
ment is becoming more and more im-
porranr. The Dayton Peace Accords in 
Bosnia for example- which wasn't a UN 
rreary - said thar all mines would be 
cleared in 30 days. I'd like ro meet the 
person who wrote that, because that was 
never going to be possible. 
Then there's the Department for 
Disarmament Affairs (DDA), who obvi-
ously deal with disarmament issues and 
are the repository for the Ottawa 'It·eary 
- which was lodged with the UN in 
1999. They arrange the annual review 
meeting and countries that have signed 
the Treaty submit their annual Article 7 re-
ports to them. 
That's the headquarters, policy level. 
However, most of the UN mine action 
projects around the world are carried out 
on a day-to-day level by agencies I ike 
UN MAS, UNDP, UNICEF and UNOPS. 
MB: Who's responsible for what at 
that level? 
IM: As I mentioned, UNMAS was cre-
ated within the DPKO to be rhe primary 
focal point for all mine action activi ty 
within rhe UN system. They coordinate 
the work of all the other agencies involved 
and have primary responsibility for policy 
issues. They also manage the Voluntary 
Trust Fund. Practically speaking, they also 
deal with emergency mine action re-
sponses usually linked to peacekeeping 
missions - they were the first ones out 
in places like Kosovo, Southern Lebanon, 
and the TSZ between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea. They also organize assessment 
missions to countries. C olombia and 
Mauritania, for example, have both re-
cently asked the UN for assistance, so 
UN MAS is putting together a team from 
the different agencies to assess what needs 
to be done. Another significant thing 
UN MAS has done is to develop (in con-
junction with the G IC HD ) the Interna-
tional Mine Action Standards (I MAS). 
UNICEF is responsible for mine 
awareness, or mine risk reduction educa-
tion as it is now called, and advocacy 
programmes. This seemed to lead o n 
naturally from their child educatio n a nd 
protection programmes. 
Other agencies like the World 
Health Organisation (WHO), World 
Food Programme (WFP) and the UN 
High Co mmiss ioner for Refugees 
(UN H C R) also get involved in mine ac-
tion, as it relates to their various man-
dates. The WFP for example, paid to have 
roads cleared in Angola so they could 
deliver food and UNHCR have funded 
the clearance of houses in Bosnia so that 
reflgees could return. 
Finally, there's UNDP - who I 
work for. We do capacity building in 
mine affected countries. At the moment, 
we're helping 16 different countries with 
various types of programmes. The way 
we work is a little different to UN MAS. 
We don't really run the show as such, but 
rather assist the government and the com-
munity to implement programmes. In 
Cambodia, for example, we assist the 
government there with funding, training 
and we also provide technical advisors. 
What we're trying to do is develop an 
overall mine action structure and capac-
ity in the country - we don't actually 
clear the mines from the ground our-
selves. UNDP also looks at the socio-eco-
nomic aspects of landmines. It's impor-
tant to know the benefits of spending 
money on mine action. If we clear this 
paddy field- will people starr growing 
rice again and will that generate income 
and employment? We've done studies like 
that in Laos and Mozambique, for ex-
ample. 
MB: Is that type of study beneficia l 
to donors? 
IM: lt is. In fact, studies like those have 
three objectives. One is to define rhe situ-
ation, so we know the impact rhar mines 
are having. The Land mine l mpact Sur-
veys fairly well cover this area now. Sec-
ond, we want to give managers the tools 
to let them set priorities. And finally, it 
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gives us the chance to tell donors what 
we're doing with their money. They'll say, 
"We've given you a million dollars, what 
have you done?" "Well , we've cleared this 
many hectares, but more imporrantly this 
has led to so many jobs created, reduced 
transport costs, increases 111 1ncome gen-
erated, etc .. " 
MB: Do you carry out t his work in-
house? 
IM: It depends on the situation. UNDP 
prefers to use what we call "national ex-
ecution" where a government ministry is 
responsible to oversee the UN projecr. We 
have this in about 5 of our coun try 
programmes. Otherwise, we tend to use 
the United Nations Office ofProgramme 
Services (UNOPS) to execute many of 
our projects. They're basically a contract-
ing agency within the UN, who special-
ize in international recruitment and 
proJeCt management services. 
MB: Does UNOPS charge a fee for 
their services? 
IM: They do. They're not allowed to raise 
money directly from donors, so they gen-
erate their income by charging for their 
services. l always compare it to putting 
up a building. UNDP has rhe idea for a. 
building and where it should go, we de-. 
sign it and arrange the money fo r it, then 
we need someone to build it for us, and 
that's where UNOPS comes in. When we 
design a project in a country, we need 
technical advisors, specialized equipment 
procurement, service contracts, office 
equipment- all that sort of stuff- and 
UNOPS arranges all those sorr of derails. 
MB: What are the criteria that the 
UN uses to provide mine action as-
sistance to a country? 
IM: The UN encourages all countries to 
sign the Ottawa Treacy, bur they wouldn't 
necessarily be excluded from receiving 
assistance if they hadn't. l n most cases, 
the humanitarian imperative is rhe most 
important criteria, and this is reflected 
in the UN policy. Sudan and Angola for 
example, haven't rarified the treaty, but 
there was an obvious need to go in and 
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help people, so projects were sta rred. ln 
borh of these cases though, it's impo rtant 
ro nore rhar rhere were things that we 
wou ld and wouldn't do. W i th rhe 
Angolan government admitting to still 
using mines for example, we wouldn't 
help the government, bur we did help 
fund NGOs working there. 
MB: Mine action now covers a whole 
range of activities - clearance, stock-
pile destruction, education - how 
did the UN evolve from just doing 
clearance to this integrated ap-
proach? 
IM: When Afghanistan starred off, ir was 
just clearance. We trained Afghans to 
clear rhe mines, bur firsr we had to find 
our where rhey were. So we ser up an 
NGO to do surveys. Then , when refu-
gees sta rred to come back, we had ro do 
some m ine awareness and of course there 
was always a need to assist mine victims. 
Also, when the Ottawa T rea ty came 
along, stockpile destructio n became an 
important issue in many countries- you 
don't have to clear rhe mines if they don't 
ever get planted. So th ings really evolved 
accord ing to need and according to what 
we were seeing was happening. lr's prob-
ably fai r ro say though, rhar the concept 
of m ine actio n has been around since the 
starr, bur the term was o nly formall y de-
fined in the 1998 UN policy on mine 
action. 
MB: What's happening in Afghani-
stan at the moment? 
IM: W ithin the UN system , UNDP is 
responsible for leading rhe overall recov-
ery effort there. In conjunction with the 
World Bank, and rhe Asian Development 
Bank, UNOP helped to prepare an our-
line needs assessmenr and presemed it ro 
donors in Tokyo in January. lr con tained 
a section on mine action, which con-
cluded that within 7 years and US$ 650 
mi llion, Afghanistan could be free from 
rhe impact of mines. 
As far as actual implemenrarion goes, 
as I said before, UNOCHA have histori-
call y been responsible for rhe oversight 
of the M ine Acrion Progra mme in Af-
ghanistan (MAPA). However, wi rh the 
establishment of a new UN structure 
there, th is may change, and UN MAS 
may rake on a srronger role. The good 
thing is that the interim Government 
wanrs rhe UN ro stay involved in mine 
action. UNDP will continue to give assis-
tance with chis in some areas, like funding, 
management training, rehab ilitation 
projects and overs igh t of a Landmine 
Impact Survey (US). 
MB: How does the management 
training work? 
IM: We run a few different types of 
programm es. Together wirh C ra nfield 
Universit y in rhe UK, we've set up some 
training courses for sen ior and middle 
managers of mine action programmes. In 
the first course, 14 senior managers from 
14 d ifferenr countries went to C ranfield. 
Since then we have conducted rwo more 
senio r managers courses, and a number 
of m iddle managers courses. Everyone got 
o n rea ll y well and at rhe end of chis train-
ing, a nd we realized rhar chis sort of in-
teraction between nationals of mine af-
fected countries was really valuable. So 
we decided to build on it and encou rage 
th is exchange of knowledge and ideas 
even more by setting up a staff exchange 
program me called MAX. For instance, 
Azerbaijan wants to begin a dog 
programme; Afghanistan has the oldest 
dog programme; so why nor send some-
one from Afghanistan to Azerbaijan to 
spend some time reaching? Or for the 
new programme in Guinea-Bissau; why 
don't we send some Portuguese-speaking 
people from Mozambique there to dem-
onsrrare the database system? Basically, 
this sort of thing is on rhe job t raining 
and about four exchanges are underway 
at presen r. 
MB: What about the Landmine Im-
pact Surveys? Can you describe what 
happens there? 
IM: The surveys a re very valuable tools 
for defining the socio-economic impact 
of mines on communities. A broad 
g rouping of organizations are now in-
volved wirh purring rhe surveys rogerher 
- donors, rhe UN, organisations like the 
Sur vey Action Centre (SAC), plus a range 
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ofNGOs who undertake the field work. 
The su rvey is parr of an integrated re-
sponse ro a landmine problem. lr's one 
of the tools used to work om what the 
problem is and where th e priorities 
should be. And now, because we've been 
doing survey~ for a whi le, there's a stan-
dard methodology developed by SAC 
rhar's fo llowed - this gives us a com-
mon ground to talk about when describ-
ing the globallandmi ne situation. 
MB: Wh a t othe r a ct iviti es does 
UNDP get involved in? 
IM: There's the socio-economic smdies 
that I've talked about. We're also do ing a 
project on reintegration of landm ine vic-
tims; nor on rhe med ical side; bur a 
programme in a number of cou ntries to 
help mine vicrims rehabi li tate meaning-
fully inro society. For example, we are 
doing an extension ro vocational train-
ing in Cambodia, where they're grear ar 
making handicrafts, bur nor so good ar 
m arketing rhem. So we've set up a busi-
ness adv isory cou ncil to help our there. 
We've a lso partnered wirh rhe Adopt-a-
Minefield programme, which has been 
very successful in raising funds in rhe 
private secror and civi l society in support 
of the UN m ine acrion effort. 
UNDP has 137 counrry offices 
around rhe world, wh ich gives us the 
broadest reach of any UN agency. If 
Mauritania asks for assistance, we have 
an office rhere; ifYietnam asks, we've gor 
an office rhere roo. T hat makes our abi l-
ity ro understand a problem and react 
accordingly very effecti ve. 
MB: Where do the funds come from 
for the programmes that you run? 
IM: Nearly all rhe mine action work 
funded by rhe UN comes from volun-
tary contributions p rovided by donors. 
Each year the UN pu ts rogerher a port-
folio of mine action projects from around 
the world. This year's edi tion has jusr been 
released, and ir includes activities in 30 
counrries. Trust Funds are often used to 
help channel rhe funds ro rhe programme 
countries. T his is essential a lor of rimes 
because in post-conflict siwarions bank-
ing systems have broken down, so they 
can't be used. D onors also wanr transpar-
ency and accou ntabi lity. so rhey may be 
more comfo rtable giving money to a UN-
managed Trust Fund, as opposed to an 
individual country. This works quite wel l 
also when smaller donors don'r have in-
country representation. 
Other rimes, donors may wanr to 
fund a p rogramme, bur nor through a 
UN crust fund. That's tine roo as long as 
rhe hosr governmem approves, and rhe 
work I S coo rdinated w irh rhe 
governmem's wishes and rhc operations 
of the MAC. One place this didn't hap-
pen so well was in Mozambique in rhe 
early days, when donors srarred 
programmes bilateral ly because rhcy were 
inreresred in doing activities in certa in 
parts of rhe coum ry. The government ar 
rhar srage was just recovering from rhe 
conflict, and donor activities weren't al-
ways as effective rhey could be, because 
rhere was no coordination. Now rhough, 
rhe new National D emining lnsrirure 
(INO) is quite organized, so 1he sirua-
rion has settled down. 
Ar rhe UN, we strive very hard to 
focus on this idea of coordination. 
Kosovo and Afghan istan are good ex-
amples of where rhe UN helped develop 
a coordinated response. In other cases, 
UND P he lps rh e Government ro 
strengthen irs own coordination capac-
icy. We'd say for example, char we need 
clearance done in these six provinces and 
ask a donor for rhat type of specific help. 
Generally, we find rhis sysrem works for 
the country, the UN and rhe donor. 
Many of rhe contributions are also 
bilateral, and donors expect the affected 
countries ro build up their own contri-
butions over rime. When a programme 
just startS though, local contributions 
may rake rhe form of providing office 
space, or paying for the electricity for the 
MAC - char sort of rhing. Then, as the 
siruarion starts to serde down , local 
knowledge and ability is built up and rhe 
governmenr starts ro pick up more of the 
tab. T his is really important because 
sooner or later, international interest may 
sran ro wane, so rhe affected counrry has 
to become involved. For example, 90% 
of rhe Croatian p rogramme, is now gov-
ernment funded. We're just about ro pull 
out of there, because we see our job as 
being done. We've helped ser up the struc-
ture, we're tra ined the staff, given them 
rhe IMSMA sysrem and standards, and 
helped ro organize projects. Th e same 
thing is happening in Cambodia, where 
rhe govern menr gives more and more 
money each year. It is currently the sixrh 
largest donor ro irs own programme. In 
rhese situations though, there still are 
donor funds required, so rhere needs ro 
be accountability. In cases like rhis, we 
recommend serring up a donor advisory 
board, rhar reporrs back to rhe govern-
ment. 
MB: Does UNDP recommend who 
sits on that board? 
IM: We can give advice on rhis. Imme-
d iately afrer a conflict, we can help roger 
the am bassadors, donors and other inrer-
esred parries together and perhaps facili-
tate rhe meerings. Again rhough , like 
ot her UNDP projects, we don't run the 
show, bur we help our. 
MB: With donors being such a criti-
cal factor, how has donor interest in 
mine action changed? 
IM : All rhe figures indicate rhar global 
funding for mine acrion has grown slowly 
over rhe past few years. To be honest, ir 
d idn't starr very high on a lisr of donor 
priorities - when Afghanistan appealed 
for money in 1988, many donors believed 
that demining should be a military issue 
and rhar rhe army should clean up after a 
war. Bur then, in the early 1990s, aware-
ness of the huge impacr oflandmines was 
raised due ro the situations in Angola, 
Kuwait, Cambodia and Afghanistan and 
the like. Along with the Ottawa Treaty 
and facrors like the involvement of Prin-
cess Diana, and the Nobel prize, world 
attention became more focused on the 
issue and donor consciousness was raised. 
At the moment, the number of countries 
that contribute ro the UN mine action 
efforts stands around 24, although only 
about 15 of them are regular donors. 
The ocher thing was that in the early 
days, most donor countries didn't know 
much abour mine action, so they'd pur 
their contributions in a Trust Fund and 
let the UN use ir. Now though, as inter-
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est and knowledge of the issue increased, 
there's been a corresponding increase in 
bilateral funding. Some donors feel rhar 
they get more visibility this way. 
Unformnately, rhe orher side of rhe 
problem is rhar rhe list of countries seek-
ing assistance has increased faster then rhe 
list of donors. In the mid 1990s, rhe UN 
was assisting six counrries with mine ac-
tion. Now it's nearly 30. In some cases 
roo, ir's hard ro susrai n interest in a 
programme or country if confl ict contin-
ues or mines are still being laid. 
MB: So does that mean there's do-
nor fatigue? 
IM: Actually, l don't agree with rhe no-
tion of donor fatigue- it is such a nega-
t ive concept to calk about. I th ink if you 
have a well-run p rogramme, and you can 
demonsrrate a need, you will get fund-
ing. "Fatigue" will only ser in if rhere's 
mismanagement or you can't demonsrrare 
rhat the work you're doing is useful. 
Besides, rhere may be other facrors 
rhar influence where, or how long a do-
nor provides assistance. Realistically, con-
rriburions can be made for all sons of 
different reasons; political, geographic, 
commercial as well as the humanitarian 
needs. A slowdown or change in funding 
on the part of the donor may nor be com-
pletely linked ro the performance of the 
programme in quesrion. 
MB: Do you have to "shop " certain 
programmes around to g et them 
funded? 
IM: Sometimes it can work that way. The 
UN puts rogerher a portfol io of m ine 
action projects every year for instance, 
which donors can reference. We may also 
ger calls from donors asking what needs 
there might be. We're moniroring 16 
countries ar the moment, soar t imes like 
this, we can say "Laos is running a lirde 
short, you could fund char." This hap-
pened recently wirh the Koreans. They 
came to us and said they wanted to pro-
vide mine acrion assistance in sourheasr 
Asia, so I said, " we've gor needs in L1os, 
Thailand and Cambodia- here's whar 
needs to be done, and here's how much 
money is required." They will then make 
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their decision on which one w fund. 
MB: Does UNDP recommend the pri-
ority area s for mine a ction? 
IM: Yes and no. WeR."Co mmend roa narional 
government rhar an inter- m iniste rial 
body is needed to oversee what's happen-
ing and help set priorit ies. M ine action 
isn't stand-alone, so th is body needs to 
have links ro o ther areas like agricu ltu re, 
transportation, foreign affai rs, defense. We 
help ro ad vise on setting up the legisla-
t ion to make rhis happen. Then, there's 
the Mine Acrion Centre, rhar often gets 
set up in-country. Th is is rhe operational 
headquarters for mine action and through 
various rools, including rhe JMSMA data-
base, they can work our what the priorities 
are. UNDPwill help set the Centre up as well. 
Then, actually carrying out acriv i-
ries relared ro rhe priorities- that's where 
local and international NGOs come in. 
MB: How do you coordinate the activi-
ties of the diffe re nt bodies involved? 
IM: That's where an integrated, national 
mine action strategy and work plan comes 
in. Based on all the information rhar has 
been garhered from the various sou rces, 
one of rhe most important rasks for the 
govern menr is ro develop this rype of 
p la n, that sets our the o bjectives and pri-
orities, as well as who is going to do what, 
and when. Usually, rhis plan is linked into 
overall national development goals and 
plans, such as reducing poverty. UNDP 
has helped a number of counrries -
Mozambique, Cambodia, L1os, Azerbaijan 
-for exa mple, to develop rhese type of 
plans. Various coordination mechanism s 
can be set up ar rhe country level to ass ist 
the planning process. 
MB: Do all programmes have na -
tional pla ns? 
IM: Some have developed very compre-
hens ive plans, and most produce some-
thing to a certain degree. It's certainly the 
ideal rhar UNDP aims for. When rhe 
Koreans came along like I mentioned and 
said that rhey wanted to help - because 
of rhe national plans, we were ready and 
were able to say "here's what needs ro be 
done, tal<e your pick. " A donor can clearly 
see what rhe national priorities and ac-
tivities are. 
Some people feel char you need ro 
wait for a full Landminc Impact Survey 
ro be done before you can come up wirh 
such a comprehensive plan- bur 1 don't 
necessarily agree with this. I chink you 
can always ger started somewhere; you 
can't jusr sir there and wai t around. Most 
countries would have enough informa-
tion to ger rhem starred and then they 
can refine and set the priorities further 
o nce mo re information comes in. Look 
at what's happeni ng in Afghanistan or 
Laos - rhey prod uce one consolidated 
workplan in coopera tion with all the 
NGOs, and then provide a consol idated 
report at the end of the year to do nors. 
MB: What are some of the pros and 
cons of working with local NGOs? 
IM: The big advanrage is char rhey use 
local people, so they're cheaper. We've 
used loca l NGOs in Afgha nis ta n , 
Azerbaijan , Bosnia and Mozambique and 
helped to develop rheir skills and capaci-
ties. However, this may nor always the 
besr way to go- especially in an emer-
gency situation like Kosovo, where there's 
no rime ro train new staff. In rhese cases , 
an inrernarional NGO char can bring 
people in quickly m ay be the best way to 
go. Another advanrage of working with a 
local NGO is char they're vi ral to rhe long 
rerm viabil ity of a programme. ln th is 
respect, char's whar UNDP's capaci ty 
building ideas are all abou t. 
Quire ofren though, ir also comes 
down to exactly what resources are avail-
ab le . Commercial co mpan ies for ex-
ample, may nor want ro work in a coun-
try like Angola because there's roo much 
risk - so we have to use local ourfi rs. As 
l said though, they may be the most suit-
able for rhe job anyway. 
MB: How does the military fit in? 
IM: When we began working in mine 
act ion , rhe UN would n'r support rhe 
milirary of a country. That po licy came 
our of working in countries where the 
m ilitary was often rhe cause of rhe prob-
lem in the first place. However, rhe argu-
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mem rhen came up that in some cases, 
the mi litary are a good option fo r certain 
aspects of mine action, like clea rance. 
T hey may nor be good ar mine aware-
ness, su rveys, or quality assu rance, bur 
chat doesn't mean rha t they should be 
excluded enrirely. So UN policy was re-
vised to allow for rh is in cases where there 
was overall civi lian control of rhe national 
structure. It's important ro note though , 
char we won't pay rhe salaries of sold iers, 
but we may ask donors to buy rhe demining 
equipmenr, or pay for insurance. 
Whatever work rhe military, and rhe 
NGOs for chat matter, does, it needs ro 
be coordinated. It's not much use clear-
ing land char will never be used by any-
one. Unfortunately though, this sti ll hap-
pens. In one country we've worked in, 
rhe government asked us to clear land for 
a school, so we did, bur th ree years larer 
srill no school. This goes to show rhat 
mine action has to be linked to definite 
government priorities and actions. Jf rice 
growing JS tmporrant to a government, 
you have to cl ear rice fie lds; if transport 
is an issue, you have to clear roads. T he 
work rhe UN supports would never get 
invo lved in clearing milita ry facilities in 
a country. 
MB: With cleara nce priorities being 
determined by the government, or by 
UN assessment missions a nd su r-
veys, whe re do com munity-based 
priorit ies fit in? 
IM: The UN assessment missio ns are 
quire broad and answer questions like; 
whar's the extent of rhe problem, which 
agency is best suited to handle it, that son 
of thing. A landm ine impact survey chen 
gives you a closer look at which commu-
nities are worst affected within a counrry. 
[r's still a national level understanding 
though . When we work wi th NGOs to 
implement programmes on a local level, 
that's where local communities come in 
and we expect the NGOs we're working 
with to rake rhe priorities of communi-
ties into account when carrying our work. 
MB: So the NGOs help to decide 
which a reas are cleared first? 
IM: T hey certainly help in rhe p lan ning 
processes due ro rheir extensive loca l 
knowledge. What the UN can do is assist 
rhrough rhe su rveys to find rhe affected 
areas, or identifY rhe activities that are 
causing a lor o f injuries. In Yemen, for 
example, there are a lot of people search-
ing forw- ,nerandgerringi njured by landmines 
in rhe process. Ar rhe national level then, 
we assist the government by sayi ng, "You 
need to address this issue, you need ro starr 
running risk reduction programmes abou r 
th is." We then help to find NGOs who 
can carry our rhese type of activities. The 
role UNDOP plays is to narrow down rhe 
options and the needs, and give a list or 
rangeofcommuniries tha t need assistance. 
ln many cases as well, the govern ment 
gets involved at this level roo. Ar the pro-
vincial and disrri cr level in L1os, there are 
development subcommirtees, and mine 
acrion representatives participate in rhese. 
From ou r point of view, as long as 
we can assist NGOs by directing them 
to rhe areas rhar need a response, and as 
long as the work rhey do is up to a certain 
standard, and they report back on rhe work 
rhey do - fi ne. Of course NGOs are fairly 
i ndependenr, bur this way of working seems 
to be effective. Kosovo, in particular, showed 
the benefits of a srrong, cenrral organization. 
MB: Would you say Kosovo is one of 
the biggest success stories in mine 
action? 
IM: D efi ni tely. A recent, independent 
evaluation acknowledged this, but also 
pointed our some advantages that rhar 
programme had. lr was a small, contained 
area, rhere was lots of donor interest, and 
a st ro ng, centra l UN coordi na t ion 
mechan ism working under a UN Secu-
riry Council Resolution. 
Jr's nor always going ro work rhis way 
though. As I've said, UNDP has to be 
in vi red into a country and it chen works 
to strengthen government capacity and 
ability. Wedefin irely rhink rhis is rhe best 
way to work in most m ine affected coun-
rries, bur ir can be difficult because of 
governmenr ownership, and government 
priorities may differ from our's. lr's an 
education process. What's imporranr ar 
rimes like this is rhe survey process, which 
allows us to say, in black and white, rhese 
are rhe worst affected communities. The 
government can't argue with rhar, it a lso 
leaves less room for corruption and m is-
application of resources. 
MB: So the Kosovo model would be 
hard to replicate? 
IM: Nor necessarily- the Afghanistan 
programme has been organ ized this way 
from rhc starr. The UN is focusing on 
improving the coordinarion mechanism, 
a nd developing rbe NGOs to do the 
work. What is differen t in the countries 
char UNDP supports, is rhe need to work 
wirh governments, it often in volves a 
much larger scale landmine threat span-
ning decades of conAicr, and less of rhe 
media spotlight ro assist the resource 
mobi lization efforrs. 
MB: By the sounds of it, fo r UND P 
programmes to be successful, you 
need a stable govern ment . Are e lec-
tions part of the process of getting 
this stable government in place? 
IM: That's one of UNDP's main roles. 
Security sector reform, governance issues, 
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judicia l reform, elections- assisting wirh 
these types of rh ings is whar UNDP docs 
all the rime. By st rengthening the gov-
ernment process in these ways, we believe 
that will in turn lead to overall poverty 
reduction and human development. 
MB: Some would say that capa city 
building is a myth - what do you think? 
IM: It's definitely nor. I am firmly in the 
camp rbar capacity building is necessary 
and successful, and you can particula rly 
see chis in counrries like Mozambique and 
Cambodia. They're going to have a mine 
problem for years ro come; the interna-
tional community can come in and help 
ro a certain point, bur rhey will have a 
residual mine threat for a while yet, so 
we have to build capacity to help them 
deal wi rh rh is. In other counrries I ike 
Guinea-Bissau and Thailand, rhe mines 
a ren't necessarily a huge problem, so ir's 
harder ro raise international interest -
bur ir's still a problem. Using Guinea-
Bissau as an example, we've only raised a 
couple of hundred rhousand dol la rs for 
that programme, bur with rhar money, 
we've provided an expert to help develop 
local sk ills and abi lities. If we had US$ 5 
mill ion, we could fix the p roblem in 6 
months- but we don't, so we have to 
come up with other ways. That's whac 
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